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Degree:           MSc 
 
With the continuous developing of the Tianjin Port, the demand for sand is increasing day by 
day. Driven by economic interests, a large number of sand carriers from inland rivers that do 
not meet safety standards are illegally involved in sand transportation. Due to the intrinsic 
defects of the inland river ships and the lack of proper safety management, the accidents of 
this type of ships have frequently occurred, which has brought great hidden dangers to the 
navigation safety of Tianjin Port. Therefore, carrying out research on the safety management 
of the Tianjin Port's sand carriers and implementing a comprehensive treatment of the them is 
an important basis for ensuring the safety of navigation.  
 
The main research object of this paper is the inland vessels that participate in sand 
transportation in Tianjin Port. First, the reasons for the occurrence of inland river sand 
carriers are introduced, and the reasons for the high risk of inland river ships are briefly 
analyzed. Through the ten years of Tianjin Port's accident statistics involving inland river 
sand carriers and related typical case studies, the technical characteristics of the inland river 
sand carriers and the operation methods in Tianjin Port have been summarized. Summarizes 
the harm brought by the inland river sand carriers, and the relevant experience in the 
management of sand carriers in Tianjin and other regions. Finally, the paper puts forward 
some suggestions by analyzing the difficulties and existing problems in the safety 
management of sand transporter.  
 
Developed countries strictly formulate their own regulations and technical specifications, and 
strictly comply with the implementation. There is basically no such problem in those 
countries. If developing countries do not involve large-scale port construction projects, there 
will be no case of inland river ships as described in this paper. It can be seen that the inland 




under the current circumstances in China.  
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1.1 Statement of problem.  
 
With the rapid development of China's economy and the further expansion of import 
and export trade, China's ports have entered a new round of construction and 
development climax. The construction of the project will require the use of a large 
number of engineering ships, and the construction will mostly be carried out in the 
shallow depth of the mudflat and near the port area. It is very difficult to find a large 
number of sea-going vessels that are suitable for the local water depth and meet the 
construction requirements in a short time. Inland river ships are generally larger in 
width and less draught, which is suitable for shallow water construction work and 
short-distance transportation of construction materials. As a result, a large number of 
inland river ships have emerged to participate in the construction of the port . 
 
Tianjin Port, as the northern international shipping center and international logistics 
center, also saw a large number of inland river ships participate in the construction of 
the port during the construction process. And these ships play a decisive role. Tianjin 
Port’s offshore projects have attracted a large number of inland river construction 
ships and sand carriers. According to statistics, during the peak period, there were 
more than 1,000 inland river construction vessels and sand carriers in Tianjin waters.  
 




are carried out on beaches with shallow water depths or in the vicinity of the port a rea. 
It is difficult for large-size sea-going construction vessels with large draughts to meet 
the needs of large-scale sea-related projects for centralized construction. As a result, a 
large number of inland river construction ships and sand carriers, which are poor in 
ship conditions but suitable for shallow water construction operations, have flooded 
into Tianjin Port and participated in the construction. As the above two types of ships 
do not meet the operational standards, the maritime traffic accidents caused by them 
increase year by year. Inland river sand carriers have once been the main factor 
leading to vicious maritime traffic accidents. Inland river sand carriers have poor 
technical conditions, low crew quality, and many hidden safety hazards in internal 
management (Yan, 2009). They also have many illegal operations and high accident 
rates. 
 
a. The condition of the ship is poor. 
 
According to investigations, more than 80% of ships engaged in sand transportation 
are inland river ships. The technical condition of this type of ship is poor. Most of the 
hulls are corroded and damaged, and there are major defects in anti-subsidence and 
hull strength. Inland river ships are mostly flat-bottomed single-hull ships, with low 
freeboards and no watertight requirements for hatch covers. It is not suitable for sea 
navigation in terms of structure, stability and equipment. When sailing in the sea area, 
due to its own poor condition, the ship is prone to sink when encountering bad 
weather. 
 
b. The crew is of low quality. 
 
The quality of the inland vessels’ crew is relatively low. They have not received 
training for survival and life-saving at sea, and know little about safety knowledge  
and regulations. The crew members do not know much about the hydrological and 




management of the vessels has caused the ship to be in a relatively dangerous 
situation most of the time. 
 
c. Ships lack effective management.  
 
Sand carriers are mostly self-employed and most of them are not managed by regular 
ship management companies. There are also some ships that are a ffiliated with ship 
management companies for management. However, affiliated companies only receive 
management fees but do not implement related management responsibilities (Wang, 
2015). 
 
d. The illegal operation is widespread. 
 
Shipowners have caused the ship to overload due to the pursuit of profits. The 
technical characteristics of the inland waterway itself are not suitable for sea transport. 
In addition to overloading, the handling performance of the ship is severely limited. 
The freeboard of the inland river ships is originally small, and overloading makes it 
even lower. This resulted in a reduction of the reserve buoyancy of the ship and a 
significant decrease in its resistance to sinking.  
 
1.2 The purpose of research.  
 
This paper takes the inland river sand carriers in Tianjin as the research object, based 
on the research object status and some existing safety management problems, starting 
from the concrete empirical data, to study the root cause of the problem. From the 
aspects of improvement of management mode, technical specification innovation, and 
formulation of laws and regulations, it is proposed to reasonably solve the safety 




safety management of sand carriers, it has very important practical significance.  
 
1.3 Basic ideas for the research. 
 
This paper mainly analyzes the basic situation of sand carriers in Tianjin, and 
summarizes the specific problems and hazards existing in such ships. Afterwards, 
based on the typical accident cases that occurred in Tianjin in recent years involving 
inland river sand carriers, a comparative analysis of the differences in the technical 
standards of inland river ships relative to sea-going vessels was conducted. Introduce 
the specific measures adopted by the Tianjin MSA and in-depth analysis of the safety 
management difficulties of the sand carriers.  Based on the reality of China, it 
proposes targeted countermeasures to solve the safety management of sand carriers in 
Tianjin. 
 
This paper has studied the accident data and adverse effects caused by sand carriers in 
the Tianjin Port in the past ten years. Through the research of typical accident cases 
and on-site investigation and research of related ship data, the general situation of 
sand carriers in Tianjin Port, the causes of ship accidents, and the problems and 
hazards of sand carriers are analyzed. Then elaborated on the specific regulatory 
measures taken by the Tianjin MSA, the results achieved, and the remaining problems. 
Finally, it proposes to solve the safety management of sand carriers from the aspects 
of improving relevant regulations, obtaining local government support, and improving 
the joint enforcement mechanism. 
 





1.4.1 Literature analysis. 
 
Based on the research purpose, this paper searches for and collates various documents 
and summarizes the contents of related documents. The author mainly understands the 
development of the safety management of sand carriers through the Internet, libraries, 
and access to internal data. It also refines the opinions and research results of relevant 
scholars on this issue and further summarizes practical and feasible countermeasures. 
The relevant scholars' views on the issue and the research results are refined, based on 
which the summary of practical and feasible countermeasures is concluded.  
 
1.4.2 Survey research. 
 
Field investigation of the specific situation and problems of the research object. 
Participate in special research symposia on issues. Conduct interviews with individual 
subjects in order to obtain detailed and accurate first-hand information and provide 
more accurate data support for the research 
 
1.4.3 Comparative analysis. 
 
This article also used the comparative analysis method to compared and analyzed the 
technical standards of inland river ships and sea vessels. Use data calculations to 






1.5 The research content.  
 
1.5.1 Research scope. 
 
The areas under the jurisdiction of the Tianjin MSA are the following A, B, C, D, E, F, 

















Figure 1.1: Tianjin MSA area. 
Source: Tianjin MSA, 2015. 
 
1.5.2 The object of management. 
 
Construction operator: refers to the general name of the unit involved in the 
construction of a wading project, an owner, or a business management unit.  
 
Sand carriers: It refers to the general name of the ships that provide sand for the 
construction of sea-related projects and temporary unloading sites.  
 
Ships for construction work: It refers to the general name of ships engaged in 
sea-related construction operations, including dredging vessels, grab ships, mud 
barges and auxiliary ships, as well as ships engaged in safety management of the 
project site and personnel transportation.  
 
Employees: refers to the general name of personnel engaged in the construction of 
projects related to the sea, including the management personnel and operating 


























Causes and status quo of inland river sand carriers. 
 
2.1 Causes of inland river sand carriers. 
 
In recent years, with the growth of China's economy, the economic development of 
the port and navigation industry has developed rapidly. In June 2002, Shanghai’s 
Yangshan Port started construction. Large-scale land reclamation has created the 
largest amount of landfills in China, and the demand for sand has increased 
dramatically in the short term. A large number of sand carriers have gathered in the 
waters of Zhejiang and Shanghai. In 2006, the Bohai Rim Port Group headed by 
Tianjin entered the construction peak, and the continuous expansion of the port 
project has led to a surge in demand for sand (Cui, 2015). On the one hand, vessels 
engaged in transportation operations along the coast have deep drafts and high 
transportation costs, which are not suitable for the needs of the short-distance sand 
transportation market. On the other hand, due to the overcapacity of inland river 
vessels engaged in transportation in the neighboring provinces, a large number of 
inland river sand carriers transported into the Bohai and engaged in short-distance 
sand transportation. 
 
Sand is indispensable building materials for infrastructure construction such as 
highways and housing. Take Jiangsu Province as an example. The province is a large 




are a limited number of sand that can be mined locally. Most of them need to be 
transported through waterways. The suburbs of Tianjin originally smashed stones that 
had been excavated and then transported them by land traffic. However, in recent 
years, environmental protection agencies have imposed higher requirements on air 
pollution, the original production technology has failed to meet the requirements, and 
manufacturers have been forced to shut down. This has led to a significant reduction 
in the amount of sand transported by road. And the demand for sand cannot be met, 
resulting in a shift in transportation to the sea. However, most of the ships engaged in 
sand transport are inland river ships. The technical condition of the ship itself is poor, 
the crew members do not have corresponding certificates of competency, and the 
ship’s operation and management are also poor. These have led to frequent water 
traffic accidents and even the occurrence of serious accidents involving the sinking of 
ships, which has brought serious threats to the safety of water transportation.  
 
2.2 Accident statistics and typical case analysis. 
 
2.2.1 Statistics of accidents from 2005 to 2014. 
 
During the ten years from 2005 to 2014, there were 283 accidents and 226 
emergencies in the Tianjin waters. Among them, there were 55 accidents and 78 
emergencies involving inland river sand carriers, accounting for 19% and 35% of the 
total. There were 36 shipwrecks, of which 26 ships were inland river sand carriers, 
accounting for 72% of the total. There were 40 deaths, of which 34 were involved in 
inland river sand carriers, accounting for 85% of the total. Among them, the situation 
in 2007 and 2010 was more serious. In 2007, the number of sunken ships accounted 
for 100% of the total, and the number of deaths and disappearances accounted for 94% 




total and deaths and disappearances accounted for 73% of the total.  
 



















2005 42/18 1/0 0 0 0 0 
2006 42/16 1/0 2 1 0 0 
2007 44/25 11/8 8 8 18 17 
2008 26/34 5/12 5 3 5 5 
2009 22/26 9/9 3 3 0 0 
2010 21/33 5/20 6 4 15 11 
2011 22/16 7/7 6 4 0 0 
2012 22/17 8/12 3 3 1 1 
2013 23/20 4/4 1 0 1 0 
2014 19/21 4/6 2 0 0 0 




 19%/35%  72%  85% 
Source: Statistics of Water Traffic Accidents of Tianjin MSA over the years. 
 
2.2.2 Typical case analysis. 
 
At 2323 on May 4, 2017, the Liberia-ship MV. ALPHA GALLANT collided with the 
Chinese ship MV. Chujiang 168 in the 38°50′.2N/118°18′.9E. MV. ALPHA 
GALIANT was a international ship, and MV. Chujiang 168 was an inland river sand 
carrier ( Tianjin MSA, 2017). 
 
a. Ship condition. 
 




The particulars of MV. ALPHA GALLANT 
Name ALPHA GALLANT Flag Liberia 
Ship type  Bulk carrier GT 92992 
NT 60544 Length overall 291.98 m 
Breadth 
moulded 




Operator ALPHA BULKERS 
SHIPMANAGEMENT 
INC. 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
Table 2.3: The particulars of MV. Chujiang 168 
The particulars of MV. Chujiang 168 
Name Chujiang 168 Flag China 
Ship type  Dry cargo ship GT 1139 
NT 638 Length overall 66.4 m 
Breadth moulded 11.92 m Total power 520.00 KW 
Owner Anhui Chujiang 
Shipping Co., Ltd.  
Operator Anhui Chujiang 
Shipping Co., Ltd. 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
Before the accident, MV. ALPHA GALLANT navigation equipment, navigation aids 
and various machinery and equipment are in good working condition. The sirens, 
taillights, and neon lights of MV. Chujiang 168 were in an unusable state. In the event 
of an accident, the ship loaded about 1,500 tons of sand. 
 
b. Crew situation. 
 
MV. ALPHA GALLANT had 20 crew members for this voyage. All crewmembers 
hold the corresponding certificates of competency. The ship meet the minimum safety 
manning certificate requirements and the crew members involved were not fatigue. 
 
MV. Chujiang 168 minimum safety manning certificate requires 7 persons. There 
were 3 crew members on the voyage. None of the 3 crew members had a valid crew 






c. The process of the accident. 
 
MV. ALPHA GALLANT was sailed from Tianjin Port at 2030 on May 4, 2017. MV. 
Chujiang 168 was loaded with about 1,500 tons of sand, and was sailed from the 
Caofeidian berth to Huanghua Port at about 2030 on May 4.  
 
At 2309, MV. ALPHA GALLANT radar found MV. Chujiang 168. MV. ALPHA 
GALLANT speed was 12.7kn and course was 100°. MV. Chujiang 168 speed was 
5.6kn and course was 188°. The distance between the two ships is 3.64 nautical miles. 
The angle between the two ships is 86.2° and the CPA is 0.51 nautical miles.  The 
following figure shows a screenshot of the MV. ALPHA GALLANT VDR. In the 
figure, “38” is MV. Chujiang 168. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The screenshot of the MV. ALPHA GALLANT VDR (1). 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
At 2314 hours, MV. ALPHA GALLANT radar alerted that there was a risk of 
collision. MV. ALPHA GALLANT speed was 13.1kn and the course was 100°. MV. 
Chujiang 168 speed was 5.1kn and the course was 207°. The distance between the two 
ships is 2.53 nautical miles. The CPA is 0.51 nautical miles, and the TCPA is 9.54 min. 






Figure 2.2: The screenshot of the MV. ALPHA GALLANT VDR (2). 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
About 2 minutes later, MV. Chujiang 168 found MV. ALPHA GALLANT through the 
radar. `MV. ALPHA GALLANT speed was 13.2kn and the course was 100.1°. MV. 
Chujiang 168 speed was 5.5kn and the course was 227°. The distance between the two 
ships is 2 nautical miles. The CPA is 0.16 nautical miles, and the TCPA is 5 min. The 
relative position of the two ships is shown below.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: The screenshot of the MV. ALPHA GALLANT VDR (3). 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
At 2319, the speed of MV. ALPHA GALLANT was 13.2kn. Turn Port side at 3 
degrees to avoid MV. Chujiang 168. The course of MV. Chujiang 168 was 230°, the 
distance was 1 nautical miles. The CPA was 0.16 nautical miles, and the TCPA was 






Figure 2.4: The screenshot of the MV. ALPHA GALLANT VDR (4). 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
 
At 2121, the speed of MV. ALPHA GALLANT was 13.1kn and the course was 97°. 
MV. Chujiang 168 speed was 6kn and the course was 243.2°. The distance between 
the two ships is 0.55 nautical miles. The CPA is 0.12 nautical miles, and the TCPA is 
2.2 min. As shown below. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: The screenshot of the MV. ALPHA GALLANT VDR (5). 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
At 2322, MV. ALPHA GALLANT turned to port side, at a speed of 13kn. The speed 
of MV. Chujiang 168 was 5.6kn and the course was 269°. The distance between the 






Figure 2.6: The screenshot of the MV. ALPHA GALLANT VDR (6). 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
At 2322, the two ships collided. The course of MV. Chujiang 168 was 290°, and the 
course of MV. ALPHA GALLANT was 83°. The relative position of the two ships at 
the time of collision is shown below. 
 
Figure 2.7: The screenshot of the MV. ALPHA GALLANT VDR (7). 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
 
d. Loss of accident. 
 
The accident resulted in a 3.3m x 0.8m hole in the ballast tank of MV. ALPHA 








Figure 2.8: The loss of MV. ALPHA GALLANT 






Figure 2.9: The loss of MV. Chujiang 168. 
Source: Tianjin MSA accident investigation report in 2017. 
 
e. Analysis of the cause of the accident. 
 
The failure of both ships to comply with the COLREGS was the direct cause of the 
accident. MV. ALPHA GALLANT did not take significant actions to avoid MV. 
Chujiang 168 and did not examine the effectiveness of the action carefully. When the 
two ships again pose a risk of collision, MV. ALPHA GALLANT cannot take timely 
and effective measures to avoid collisions between the two ships. MV. Chujiang 168 
did not maintain a regular watchkeeping and did not find the danger of collision with 
MV. ALPHA GALLANT in time, blindly took measures to avoid collisions, resulting 
in a collision between the two ships.  
 
MV. Chujiang 168 is a inland river vessel. Navigation aids equipped on ships do not 
have the function. Ship crew lack the necessary professional knowledge and skills and 




the minimum safety manning requirements and the crew did not obtain the  
corresponding certificates. 
 
2.3 Inland river sand carriers technical analysis. 
 
The following is a comparison of the technical requirements for inland river sand 
carriers and the requirements for sea-going vessels combined with the 
hydro-meteorology and sea conditions in Tianjin Port. It mainly compares the 
requirements of stability, load line, anchoring equipment, life-saving appliances and 
so on.  
 
First introduce the hydrological and meteorological conditions in Tianjin Port. 
According to the statistics of Tianjin Port and related departments, the hydrological 
and meteorological conditions in Bohai Bay are as follows: The probability of wind 
scale greater than 6 is about 5%. The probability of wave height greater than 2 meters 
is approximately 3%; the probability of wave height 1.3 meters to 1.5 meters is 
approximately 4.5%; the probability of wave height 1.6 meters to 2 meters is 
approximately 3.86%. The number of frozen days on the sea is about 65 days a year.  





The requirements for the ships in the Inland A-class navigation area and in the 
sheltered water are relatively close. There is a certain gap between the requirements 
for the ships in the Inland B-class navigation area and in the sheltered water, and 




C-class navigation area, the problem of the roll angle was not considered when 
designing. It should not be used for maritime sheltered water. 
 
Therefore, it is strictly forbidden that vessels in the Inland River C-class sail 
navigation area at sheltered water. If no measures such as increased freeboard or load 
shedding are applied, the vessels in the Inland A-Class navigation area shall be 
restricted to a maximum of 6 in the state of the sea in which they sail, and the visual 
height shall not exceed 2 meters. the vessels in the Inland B-Class navigation area 
shall be restricted to a maximum of 4 in the state of the sea in which they sail, and the 
visual height shall not exceed 1.5 meters. 
 
2.3.2 Loading line. 
 
Select two typical ships MV. Suhuaiji 4472 and MV. Wanfunan 0518 as examples and 
calculate the freeboard values in different navigation area. The calculation results are 
shown in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. 
 















445 445 474 387 152 
 


















622 622 642 499 300 
 
From the above two tables, it can be seen that the freeboard value of the Inland 
A-class navigation area calculated according to the specifications for inland river 
ships is similar to the value of the coastal and sheltered navigation areas.  The 
freeboard value of the Inland B-class navigation area is slightly smaller, while the 
freeboard value of the Inland C-class navigation area is significantly smaller than the 
coastal and sheltered navigation areas. Therefore, the ship should be required to have 
deck hatch closure equipment, drainage equipment and crew protection facilities.  
 
2.3.3 Anchoring equipment. 
 
Take the aforementioned two typical ships, MV. Suhuaiji 4472 and MV. Wanfunan 
0518 as an example. The requirements of the anchorage and anchor chain for the 
sheltered navigation area are not much different from those for the Inland A-class 
navigation area and the Inland B-class navigation area. Moreover, taking into account 
that the ship is generally left with a corresponding design margin, it can be required 
that the anchoring and mooring equipment of the ship meet at least the requirements 
for the mooring and mooring equipment for the vessel in the Inland B-class 
navigation area. 
 
2.3.4 Life-saving appliances. 
 
a. Survival craft. 
 




ship: The inflatable life raft should be equipped for cargo ships sailing in the sheltered 
area and with a length greater than or equal to 25 meters. The number of occupants 
can not be less than 100% of the total number of ships. 
 
b. Personal life-saving appliances. 
 
Compared with the requirements of inland river ships and sea-going ships, it can be 
seen that: There is not much difference in the requirements for the life jackets. The 
inland river ships requires 110% and the sea-going ships requires at least 100%.The 
requirements for the lifebuoys of sea-going vessels are higher than those of inland 
river ships. Not only are they more quantitative, but some of the lifebuoys require 
self- igniting lights, self-activating smoke signals, and buoyant lifeline.  
 
2.4 General situation of sand transportation in Tianjin. 
 
2.4.1 The source of sand and the regular route for the transportation of sand. 
 
The main sources of sand in Tianjin Port include Huludao, Yingkou, Yantai, and 
Caofeidian. Among them, black sand is mainly from Caofeidian, yellow sand from 
other places above. Ships that transport sand are mostly inland river vessels, but there 
are also a few sea-going vessels. From Caofeidian to Tianjin, there are regular routes 
for sand carriers, and several sand carriers are often lined up for sailing. Some of them 
are overloaded. Most of the sand carriers are sailing during the day and some of them 
are sailing at night. The route is on the north side of Caofeidian and crosses the 
anchorage of Tianjin Port to Tianjin Linang, Nanjiang, Nangang and other ports. The 
route is about 30-35 nautical miles, and the longest distance is only 10 nautical miles 





Table 2.6: Tianjin sand source distribution. 





Yingkou and Dandong 
In the upper reaches of 
the Yalu River in 
Dandong, 14 legal sand 







3 Tianjin None - - 
4 Shandong 






According to statistics, from January to August 2011, the number of sand carriers 
entering and leaving Tianjin Port was 27,262, which was the highest in history. The 















Figure 2.10: Tianjin Port sand carriers statistics from January to August 2011. 
 
2.4.2 Distribution of unloading points and use of sand. 
 
According to statistics, there are 27 unloading points along the coast of Tianjin, which 
are located in Dongjiang, Nangang, Lingang, Hangu and Nanjiang. 10 of them are 
illegal unloading points and have not gone through relevant procedures. 70% of these 
sand are used for land construction and 30% are used for coastal construction. The 
total demand for sand for coastal projects is 109.7 million tons. Currently, it has used 
2.11 million tons, and it still needs 8.86 million tons. The estimated demand for sand 
on land construction is 25.6 million tons. It can thus be seen that the source of sand is 
mainly focused on land construction, and the use of sand in the sea-related projects 






Figure 2.11: Distribution of unloading points in Tianjin Port 
 





The illegal unloading point and the sand carriers are cash transactions, so as to avoid 
the supervision of relevant departments and to avoid the responsibility of sand 
transport and mining. This results in the lack of necessary safety supervision for sand 
carriers, and the safety of those ship are completely controlled by themselves. Due to 
the fact that the owner is mostly an individual shipowner, there is no economic power 
to invest a lot of money in the transformation of ships and the provision of safety 
equipment, and the ship conditions of sand carriers are extremely difficult to improve.  









































Major hazards and management experience in Tianjin 
 
3.1 Major hazards. 
 
Chapter II has analyzed that due to the technical conditions and staffing of the inland 
sand carrier itself, it is easy to cause collisions and sunken accidents, and direct loss 
of personnel and property. In addition, the sand carriers will also bring harm to the 
navigable environment, sand source environment, and local society. Moreover, this 
hazard has an expanding trend. 
 
3.1.1 Impact on the navigation environment.  
 
The sand carrier sails disorderly within the route and does not obey the command of 
the VTS. They seriously hamper the normal traffic order and pose a safety risk. There 
are a large number of chemical tankers and oil tankers in Tianjin Port. Once a sand 
carrier collides with them, it will cause leakage of chemicals or oil. This will seriously 
pollute the marine environment and endanger people’s lives and property. Some sand 
carriers have not signed any agreements or contracts with the employers. If 
shipwrecks occur, the shipowners often do not show up. The shipowner did so in 
order to evade the legal sanctions and the victim’s claim. Even if the shipowner shows 




contract, it would refuse to invest in salvage. As a result, many sand carriers could not 
be salvaged after they were sunk. This seriously affected navigation safety (Zhang, 
Sun, & Zhou, 2014). 
 
3.1.2 Impact on the sand source  environment. 
 
Illegal mining of sand has brought huge ecological disasters to the sand source. Sand 
is not only a precious mineral resource but also an important part of the marine 
ecological environment. It plays an irreplaceable role in maintaining the marine 
environment, protecting the marine shoreline resources, and maintaining the coastal 
landforms. 
 
At the same time, the fishery in the sand source area has also been greatly affected.  A 
water area in Qingdao used to be a natural breeding area for Wenchang fish, noodle 
fish and pike crabs. However, with the illegal mining of sea sand, the habitat of these 
marine organisms has been severely damaged and the number has dropped 
dramatically. Due to the serious illegal mining, some shoreline beaches have been 
retired to the houses of shore residents. In the late 1990s, due to illegal mining, a 
collapse accident occurred on Changdao, Yantai, resulting in the collapse of more than 
one hundred houses. The illegal mining near the shore has also caused the local 
coastline of Rizhao, Shandong, to recede nearly 100 meters (Zhao, 2011). 
 
3.1.3 Impact on local society. 
 
Since the majority of inland rivers carriers are self-employed, their economic strength 
is weak and their ability to resist risks is seriously insufficient. In the event of a crew 




carriers accident has caused many public disturbances. In 2008, a sunk accident 
occurred in MV. Wanaijiang06 and 2 people died. Many seafarers’ families gathered 
at the Tianjin MSA, seriously affecting their normal operations. In 2009, the "4.15" 
accident in Dagang caused 10 deaths. More than 200 family members of the dead 
crew gathered in the Dagang District government. In 2010, MV.Fenggang501 sank, 8 
people died and more than 100 people gathered in Xingang MSA. In 2010, MV. 
Haiyun137 sunk. Three people were killed in the accident and more than 90 people 
gathered in Binhai New Area Government. In 2012, an explosion occurred on MV. 
Dongninghu1278, causing 6 deaths. More than 100 people gathered in Dagukou MSA. 
The occurrence of several incidents has seriously interfered with the normal social 
order and the social influence is extremely poor.  
 
3.1.4 The hazard of inland sand carriers continues to increase. 
 
From the investigation of the accident, it has been found that the ship type used for 
transporting sand has begun to show a trend of large-scale. From the past 1,000 tons 
to nearly 10,000 tons, the ship's scale and the load of sand have increased. These ships 
cannot provide any construction drawings. Some of the ships’ certificates provided are 
forged. The number of crew members has increased to nearly 20, and they do not have 
corresponding crew certificates. Many accidents of this type of ship occurred in Bohai 
Bay, causing huge loss of personnel and property, which poses a great threat to the 
equipment of the port and the navigational safety of the ship.  
 
3.2 Regulatory experience in other places. 
 
For the safety management of inland sand carriers, the following literature has 







Wang Wei described the negative impact of the disorderly mining of sand and gravel 
on the society, and analyzed the problems existing in Difficulties and 
countermeasures in recovery of gravel and sand mining in Bohai Sea area  (Wang, 
2011). It emphasized that relevant legislation should be strengthened to establish 
industry standards. It also requested the local government to lead various departments 
to carry out management, at the same time carry out various aspects of publicity, 
highlighting the source of management. Wang Jian analyzed the characteristics of 
sand and gravel vessels in Bohai Bay in Study on Safety Management 
Countermeasures for Sand Carriers in Bohai Bay (Wang, 2011). It summed up the 
technical defects and regulatory difficulties of the inland river sand carriers and put 
forward targeted recommendations for strengthening the safety management of sand 
carriers in the Bohai. 
 
3.2.2 The Taiwan strait 
 
Qiu Huazan proposed in Reflections on the Effective Supervision and Management of 
Taiwan Sand Carriers in Xiamen Port that it is the classified management of sand 
carriers (Qiu, 2012). It describes the status of classified management research and the 
application of such management measures. Wang Xianshui analyzed human factors, 
ship factors, and environmental factors in Analysis and Countermeasures for the 
Safety of Sand Carriers in  the Taiwan Strait (Wang, 2011). It proposed that 
shipowners should promptly update the status of ships, avoid vicious competition in 





3.2.3 Yangtze River, Pearl River and other inland rivers 
 
Xu Yan analyzes the status quo of inland river sand carriers on the trunk of the 
Yangtze River in Research on the Current Status and Countermeasures of the 
Management of Sand Carriers in the Yangtze River Trunk Line (Xu, 2013). From the 
accidents involving sand carriers that occurred in the Yueyang area, the main causes 
of the accidents were summarized, and solutions to the problems were proposed 
accordingly. Zhou Zhibin introduced the distribution of the sand field in the Pearl 
River estuary in On the Pearl River Estuary Sand Carriers Management Status and 
Countermeasures (Zhou, 2008). It analyzes the management status of sand carriers, 
and proposes specific measures such as strengthening source management, preventing 
overloading of sand carriers, regulating the sand carriers market, ensuring the interests 
of sand carriers owners, strengthening seafarer education, and strictly controlling ship 
inspections. Liu Ruoqiu summarized the hazards of sand carriers in the middle 
reaches of the Yangtze River in Research on the Countermeasures against the 
Outstanding Illegal Acts of Controlling Ships in Sand Shipments (Liu, 2010). It sums 
up the measures for controlling outstanding illegal acts of sand carriers. Li Changbin 
analyzed the problems in the safety management of sand carriers on the Xijiang River 
in Supervision Issues and Countermeasures for Xijiang Sand Carriers (Li, 2009). It 
put forward solutions to strengthen company management, strengthen crew education, 
enhance management transparency, and strengthen dynamic management.  Fu Chaojie 
analyzed the many reasons for the complex and difficult management of ships in sand 
transport in Hanjiang in On the Standard Management Measures for the Promotion of 
Sand Carriers for Hanjiang (Fu, 2010). It learns from the successful experience of 
Hanjiang sand carriers management, and puts forward specific countermeasures and 
suggestions from the aspects of strengthening inspection and certification, 
strengthening communication and contact between departments, and promoting the 





3.3 The experience of Tianjin. 
 
3.3.1 Strengthen safety management. 
 
a. Conduct centralized management according to the situation. 
 
Tianjin Maritime Bureau combined with the characteristics of Tianjin Port, using 
on-site inspections, ship visas and safety control, gradually found out the basic 
situation of the wading construction units in the area. They surveyed the location of 
the unloading point and carefully quantified the amount of unloading at each point.  
Through these tasks, they have initially mastered the basic information, customary 
routes, and working hours of inland rivers sand carriers, laying a foundation for 
carrying out special management.  
 
From November 1, 2007 to November 1, 2009, the Tianjin MSA focused on the 
rectification activities of inland river ships involved in sea-going transport. The 
two-year rectification activities has largely stopped the spread of inland river sand 
carriers. On March 11, 2011, the Tianjin MSA jointly organized special treatment of 
inland river sand carriers in the Bohai with MSA units such as Liaoning, Hebei and 
Shandong, and severely cracked down on illegal activities.  
 
b. Increase supervision. 
 
First, Tianjin MSA urge the wading construction operation units to carry out 
operations in strict accordance with the contents and requirements of the approval of 
the MSA, and intensify the investigation and punishment of the transport operations 
vessels employed by the operating units. They strictly investigated the violations of 




serious treatment in accordance with relevant laws (Zhang, & Geng, 2011). 
 
The second is to rely on the “1+3” maritime dynamic supervision model (1 is 
command center, 3 are VTS, maritime patrols and onshore patrol forces) to enhance 
the regulatory effect (Yuan, & Liu, 2012). 
 
The third is to divide it into different levels of regulatory grids in combination with 
reality. The customary route for sand transportation and the wading project site are the 
focus of safety management. Rationally deploy existing law enforcement forces, 
combine the power of VTS and maritime patrols, and strengthen the safety 
management of ships involved in the construction of water-related projects. 
 
c. Use the power of local government to participate in safety management. 
 
Through years of governance, the Tianjin MSA has gradually realized that there are 
many regulatory agencies involved in the management of gravel industry. It will be 
difficult to effectively manage it if they rely solely on the MSA. Through concrete 
practice, the local government takes the lead in organizing the joint enforcement of all 
relevant departments to be the most effective means of combating illegal sand mining 
and sand transport (Zhang, 2011). Therefore, Tianjin MSA actively reported to the 
local government in the work of rectifying the inland river sand carriers. And they 
regularly report safety management information and strive for the strong support of 
the Tianjin local government. 
 
3.3.2 Regulate sand transport at sea. 
 
After several years of special remediation, the situation of transporting sand and stone 




eradicated. The demand for sand has always existed. Therefore, relevant departments 
need to regulate the sand shipping market. 
 
a. Let the employees of the sand carriers participate in the safety management.  
 
First, actively promote the wading project builders to join the safety management, and 
require them to sign safety responsibility agreements with the construction vessels 
and constructors and report them to the maritime department. For those who have not 
signed related agreements, no construction permit will be issued (Li, Ma, Ma, Chen, 
Zhang, & Qiao, 2014). 
 
Second, establish and improve the interview mechanism for wading project builders 
and conduct timely and effective interviews with relevant responsible persons of the 
project. For wading project projects with major safety risks, regular interviews are 
conducted to ensure the effectiveness of interviews (Wang, 2015). 
 
The third is to establish a construction risk deposit system. Only after paying the risk 
security deposit can the construction be allowed. In this way, it is possible to 
guarantee the payment of compensation for traffic accidents involving sand carrie rs. 
 
b. Implement the access system for sand transportation.  
 
The first is to strengthen the access management of wading project construction units. 
For those wading engineering units that do not comply with the safe operating 
conditions or have not established a corresponding safety management mechanism, no 
permit shall be issued (Chen, & Wang, 2008). 
 
The second is to strengthen the management of the access of sand carriers and the 
crew working on them. Formulate access conditions for sand carriers in line with the 




standard formulated the Special Measures for Special Campaigns for Sand Carriers in 
the Bohai and Provisional Regulations for the Provisional Simplified Inspection of 
Ships Operating in the Bohai Sea. Licenses are issued for ships that meet the 
conditions for safe operation. Strictly inspect whether the sand carriers involved in the 
construction of water-related projects have a permit. It is forbidden for construction 
vessels without licenses or without the consent of the MSA to enter the construction 
area. 
 
The third is to intervene in water-related projects in advance, and pay attention to 
strengthening the links with local governments, port management departments a nd 
other units. Grasp the project information early, communicate with the owner in 
advance, publicize related laws and regulations, and promptly put forward regulatory 
requirements. 
 
c. Regulate sand market. 
 
The Tianjin MSA gradually regulates the sand transport activities at sea and guides 
the sand carriers to formality, so that the management of sand carriers is changed from 
disorder to order. 
 
First, provide necessary information services and technical support for companies or 
individuals that legally mine and transport sand. To legitimate enterprises, issue 
permits in a timely manner and actively support the sand mining enterprises to operate 
according to law (Zhou, 2009). 
 
Second, guide and encourage qualified ships to enter the sand transport market. For 
ships that do not fully meet the requirements for navigational safety, they are required 
to be equipped with appropriate navigation safety, communication and life-saving 
equipment in accordance with relevant technical requirements. After meeting the 






Third, the employers are required to select sand carriers that meet the safe operating 
conditions and standards, and organize sand carriers to accompany navigation. 
 
Fourth, to improve the crew’s skills, companies should train seafarers in the areas of 







































Difficulties and existing problems in safety management of sand carriers  
 
4.1 Difficulties in safety management of sand carriers. 
 
4.1.1 Many departments that manage sand transportation have resulted in 
inefficiencies. 
 
The sand industry involves mining, transportation, loading and unloading, and sales. 
The management department involves various departments such as harbor master, 
MSA, SOA, and CII. Most aspects of safety management go beyond the scope of the 
MSA’s rights. Different departments have different regulatory authority and work 
goals. Therefore, there is a problem of coordination when the problem of sand 
transportation needs to involve multiple departments. A single department can't cure 
the problem based on its own authority (Huang, 2011). The problem described earlier 
in this paper is mainly the issue of sand in the transport sector. According to the 
working authority of the MSA, management can only be strengthened at the 
transportation stage, and it is impossible to fundamentally solve the problem. 
 
Although the local government attaches great importance to the management of sand 
carriers, specific tasks are borne by different functional departments. The focus of the 




attitudes in the coordination process, which creates great difficulties for joint 
management among departments. Subsequent management is also difficult to follow 
up in a timely manner, resulting in the incomplete resolution of the problem of the 
safety management of existing sand carriers. 
 
4.1.2 It is difficult to improve regulatory cooperation when information is 
unbalanced. 
 
According to investigations, sand carriers engaged in marine transportation in Tianjin 
sea area mainly come from Shandong, Anhui, and Fujian provinces, and the locations 
for ship registration are not local. The certificate held by the crew is also obtained by 
the local MSA of the province they belong to. Due to the low level of information 
sharing, most of the ship and crew's certificate information is difficult to identify 
effectively, which brings many problems to the site's safety management and 
subsequent investigations that may involve accidents (Xu, Zhou, & Yang, 2009). 
Ships are very mobile. A large number of inland river vessels that go out to carry out 
transportation operations make it difficult for the competent authorities at the port of 
registry to manage them. The untimely sharing of information between management 
departments has resulted in inefficient management of safety.  
 
4.1.3 Disposal of illegal acts is difficult. 
 
a. The effect of administrative penalty is minimal. 
 
Most illegal sand carriers do not have relevant certificates. When the MSA punished 
illegal sand carriers, it was often impossible to determine the object of punishment 




by other means, if the ship owner does not cooperate with the work of the MSA (such 
as refusing to pay the fine), the maritime administrative penalty will be difficult to 
implement. In addition, the amount of fines is limited. Compared to the huge profits 
from the transport of sand, the amount of fines imposed by administrative penalties is 
far from sufficient deterrent to illegal  transport. In practice, the phenomenon of 
illegal sand transportation continues after penalties have been paid (Cao, 2012). 
 
b. It is difficult to take administrative compulsion. 
 
In fact, many ship owners have deliberately evaded and refused to cooperate.  Even if 
a large amount of cost is used to implement the enforcement measures, if the seized 
ship does not have effective control of the public security and CCG, it will seek 
opportunities to escape and continue illegal traffic activities (Wang, 2008). 
 
c. It is difficult to investigate and collect evidence. 
 
The cases involving illegally sand carriers have features such as unclear on-spot, 
related physical evidence, and lack of effective witness testimony. At present, the 
measures against illegal sand transport are mainly investigated on the spot.  If the law 
enforcement officers cannot shoot or collect evidence of the illegal activities being 
carried out by the parties concerned, the subsequent evidence collection will be 
difficult. Many of the evidence collected is not persuasive in the judicial process and 
therefore administrative penalties cannot be effectively implemented.  
 
4.1.4 Lack of law enforcement has led to the lack of timely and effective 
management. 
 






First of all, sand carriers are often operated far away from the shore, where law 
enforcement forces are weak. In addition to sheltering and supplying, they basically 
do not berth. Secondly, most of the unloading operations are carried out in shallow 
areas far from the main port area. The unloading point is set up temporarily and the 
operator has no fixed location. These factors, to some extent, have brought difficulties 
to the limited maritime management forces.  
 
b. The time characteristics of the operation of sand carriers have also brought 
difficulties to the implementation of effective management.  
 
Most of the sand carriers are loaded and unloaded during the day and sailed at night. 
This mode of operation makes it easier for them to escape the supervisio n of cruise 
ships. Individual illegal sand carriers even berth and unload sand during weekends 
and holidays, which poses a great challenge to safety management. At the same time, 
construction projects are scattered over long coastlines, most of which are p laces that 
patrol boats cannot reach, resulting in the inability of the MSA to monitor them 
effectively. 
 
4.1.5 The management of the source of sand is difficult.  
 
a. The source of sand mining is difficult to manage. 
 
Due to the large mobility of ships and the fact that most ships adopt night-time 
operations in order to evade management, it is difficult for them to carry out 
round-the-clock supervision. In addition, because some regulatory authorities only 




mining are rampant (Zhong, 2008).  
 
b. The source of sand unloading is difficult to manage. 
 
Most of the sand carriers can unload the sand directly without using the quayside 
loading equipment after reaching the destination port (Lv, 1994). This unloading 
method often takes only two or three hours to complete. Dispersion of operation sites 
and short operation hours make it almost impossible for the relevant management 
departments to manage them in unloading sector. 
 
c. The source of consumption is difficult to manage. 
 
On the one hand, some construction companies have the phenomenon of 
subcontracting the sand supply business and do not sign contracts, causing the 
management department to have blind spots in the management of sand carriers. On 
the other hand, the management of sand market is not standardized enough, and the 
situation of illegal mining and selling of sand is ubiquitous. Individual units 
unilaterally pursue interests and do not pay attention to safety responsib ilities, 
resulting in long-term chaos. There are sand carriers employment units even interfere 
with the management of administrative authority, resulting in a large number of ships 
that do not meet the safe operating conditions into the Bohai.  
 
d. It is difficult to manage the source of construction of sand carriers. 
 
Due to the authority of the management, the construction inspection of the sand 
carriers shall be performed by the ship inspection department of the construction site. 
Due to the limited power of local ship inspection departments, the corresponding 
supervisory duties cannot be effectively implemented. This has caused many sand 
carriers to engage in sand transportation operations without survey, and the ship’s own 





e. The government of the port of registry does not fully play its role in safety 
management. 
 
Most of the inland river sand carriers come from underdeveloped provinces, and the 
economic development of their regions is slow. This led the local government to 
initiate the idea of using the ship transportation industry to drive the development. 
However, the limited transportation market in the port of registry has resulted in a 
large number of ships being forced to go out to expand their businesses, making it 
difficult for the authorities in the port of registry to manage them.  
 
4.2 Existing problems in safety management of sand carriers. 
 
4.2.1 Sand resources are unevenly distributed. 
 
China's sea sand resources are relatively abundant, but the distribution is uneven.  At 
present, there are no relevant plans for the mining of sea sand by the state and local 
governments. The provinces and cities (such as Tianjin), where there is a demand for 
sand, do not have sufficient sea sand resources, while the provinces with rich sea sand 
resources have strict control over sea sand mining due to relatively less demand for 
sea sand. Nowadays, it is impossible to plan the development and utilization of sea 
sand from the perspective of the state. The practice of all provinces and cities is also 
difficult to unify, resulting in a serious contradiction between supply and demand  ( Yu, 
Song, Luo, Wu, & Fan, 2015). 
 
According to research, the total demand for sand for onshore and offshore projects in 




sand for land construction. In contrast to the huge sea sand demand, there is no sea 
sand resource in the Tianjin. The large amount of sea sand required for project 
construction mainly comes from Liaoning, Hebei and Shandong. Unlike Tianjin, the 
above three provinces have relatively less demand for sea sand, and therefore they 
strictly control sea sand mining. This led to the prominent contradiction between the 
supply and demand of sea sand in the Bohai Bay region.  
 
4.2.2 There is a conflict between policy restrictions and demand. 
 
In recent years, due to the country’s increasing emphasis on the protect ion of the 
environment and resources, the exploitation of sea sand is limited. In 2010, the SOA 
suspended the use of sea areas for sea sand exploitation in the Pearl River estuary. 
Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces have also issued corresponding regulations for the 
protection of the marine environment, clarifying the protection of marine resources 
and cracking down on illegal sand extraction. Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong and other 
provinces have similar regulations and strictly control sea sand exploitation. Sea sand 
is a good building material, and the demand for it grows year by year. Tianjin’s large 
number of projects involving sea-related projects and urban construction have huge 
and continuous demand for sand. Although the state and some local governments have 
limited the exploitation of sea sand, some people have even driven their illegal mining 
of sea sand under the draconian interests. This has led to rampant illegal sand mining.  
 
4.2.3 Huge profits drive illegal sand transport.  
 
Since 2007, the MSA and some local governments have cracked down on illegal 
mining and transportation of sea sand. However, the illegal sand transport has not 




industry. A kiloton-class sand carrier with an investment of approximately RMB 10 
million can create huge benefits of several hundred thousand yuan each day, and can 
recover all the investment in less than one year.  
 
Driven by the huge profits, the illegal sand mining at sea has intensified. Since most 
of the sea sand does not have legal sources, the first link in the sand transport industry 
is illegal. This has resulted in the illegal operation of the entire sand transport industry 
chain. 
 
The rise of the sand industry has driven the development of the shipbuilding and 
repairing industry. As an important part of the sand industry chain, sand carriers are 
built in large numbers. In order to extract huge profits, without the permission of the 
relevant departments, shipowners privately built or reconstructed dry bulk carriers to 
transport sand. The shipbuilding industry chain has also been initially formed, and it 
has become a production line for illegally sand carriers. 
 
4.2.4 The technical standards for sand carriers are difficult to determine in the 
short term. 
 
China's ship construction and inspection specifications are divided into two branches, 
inland river ships and sea-going ships, which are formulated by the state. The 
specifications are issued and updated by the MSA of the Ministry of Transport every 
year, which have corresponding legal effects and standardize the standards for 
shipbuilding and inspection work. The renewal of the standards of the sea-going 
vessels is revised with reference to the adjustment of the correspond ing international 
conventions and the actual situation in China. The inland river ships conducts a 
professional evaluation in accordance with the requirements of the sea-going vessels, 




between the two kinds of ships, but the technical parameters, ship equipment and 
other aspects are similar. This has led to a relatively vague demand for sand carriers, 
and there is no clear rule for shipowners to implement. This has led to chaos in 












































Improve safety management advices 
 
The number of departments involved in inland rivers and gravel vessels is numerous, 
and the relationship between management areas and jurisdictions is complex. 
Concretely, it involves the links of mining, transporting, unloading, and selling. The 
MSA only deals with part of the transport link. In order to effectively solve the current 
problems, each link involves departments that should work together. At the same time, 
local governments should also organize the relevant regulatory authorities involved in 
the incident, and formulate policy measures and industry technical standards suitable 
for regional development. 
 
5.1 Strengthen planning to solve the contradiction between supply and demand.  
 
5.1.1 Unified planning for reasonable exploitation of sea sand resources. 
 
From the point of the environmental problems caused by sea sand mining and the 
rational use of resources, sea sand near the coast should not be mined.  It is necessary 
to fully investigate the state of the country’s sea sand resources from the national level 
and rationally plan the sea sand mining area. At the same time, sand mining 
companies should be encouraged to sand in deep-sea areas (20 kilometers away from 





In response to the demand for sand in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and the Bohai 
Rim, local governments should strengthen cooperation in this regard. The government 
should delineate the mining area where resources are abundant and suitable for 
exploitation, and specify the time and conditions. In this way, resources can be  
rationally exploited to achieve the purpose of regulating the order of the sand mining 
market. 
 
5.1.2 Strengthen regional cooperation. 
 
Local governments in the Bohai Rim area should strengthen coordination and 
rationally plan the exploitation and utilization of sea sand in the region to solve the 
contradiction between supply and demand existing in the region and standardize the 
sea sand industry. While strengthening cooperation in the development of sea sand, it 
is necessary to join forces with local governments and departments in increasing 
efforts to crack down on illegal sand transport operations.  
 
5.2 Improve laws and industry technical standards. 
 
5.2.1 Improve local regulations. 
 
At present, Fujian Province, Zhangzhou have made useful attempts to regulate 
legislation at the sea sand source.  Zhangzhou had passed local laws and regulations to 
promulgate the Regulations for the Control of Sand Mining in Zhangzhou, which 
clarified that the management of sand mining is led by loca l governments and 




This will regulate the management of the sea sand from the source of the mining and 
will effectively affect the regulatory issues of the other parts involved in sea sand. 
 
In terms of the current status, Tianjin can establish local regulations in the 
transportation sector. In this regard, Guizhou Province made a useful attempt. Its 
Waterway Traffic Management Regulations of Guizhou issued in 2007 clarified that 
the waterway enterprises engaged in commercial transportation should meet the 
relevant requirements of the region in addition to meeting the national regulations.  
Moreover, it clarifies the standard ship types that should be adopted by operators 
engaged in water transport. The standard ship types are to be published by the 
relevant departments in Guizhou Province. Tianjin can establish local laws and 
regulations regarding the safety management of ships assisting in coastal wading 
projects, in order to clarify issues such as technical requirements, operational 
standards, and legal responsibilities. This can provide favorable legal protection for 
dealing with the actual problems that currently exist.  
 
5.2.2 Establish special technical standards for sand carriers. 
 
In view of the situation in Tianjin, the government should formulate technical 
standards for sand carriers suitable for the region. The relevant departments shall 
carry out special survey of ships engaged in the transportation of sand. For ships that 
meet the standard requirements, they may be allowed to engage in appropriate 
transportation operations. In this way, ships with poor technical conditions can be 
phased out. Local governments should strengthen the management of shipyards. 
Strengthen safety management from the stages of ship design, construction and 





5.3 Regulate the sea sand industry. 
 
5.3.1 Strengthen the management of all aspects of the sea sand industry. 
 
Tianjin can coordinate the surrounding areas to issue corresponding laws and 
regulations as soon as possible to regulate the sand mining activities. At the same time, 
for the designated area for sand mining, the SOA should effectively supervise the sand 
mining activities. The Tianjin MSA shall work with CII, CCG, and SOA to increase 
the management of sea sand transport links. Local governments should ban illegal 
unloading sites and approve legal terminals to carry out sand unloading operations. 
 
5.3.2 Improve the illegal cost of sand ship. 
 
The Administrative Compulsion Law of the People’s Republic of China was 
implemented on January 1, 2012, which enriches the regulatory means that the 
regulatory agency can adopt. It will strengthen the management of ships engaged in 
the illegal transportation of sand. In the future, penalties for illegal companies and 
personnel should be increased. For example, ships with poor shipping conditions 
should be demolished, and illegally sourced sea sand should be confiscated. 
 
5.3.3 Strengthen the propaganda about sand ship safety. 
 
The government can use news, radio, and other methods to publicize the safety issues 
related to sand carriers. Shipowners and employers of sand carriers should also 




rooted.  The management department can strengthen the propaganda of the sand 
carriers by issuing promotional materials and posting reminder slogans. The VTS can 
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